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Abstract 
Theoretical and empirical research on quantity implicature has concurred that pragmatically 
strengthened, richer readings are not available when they are not relevant to the discourse 
purpose.  However, this claim relies on an appeal to a notion of "relevance" which has proved 
difficult to make precise.  In this paper I discuss and contrast two potential contributory 
factors to relevance: adherence to the QUD, and form-based priming effects.  The former can 
be considered to operate at a relatively high level of analysis, from the speaker's perspective, 
and influences the semantic content that the speaker should be attempting to convey, while 
the latter is assumed to reflect low-level psychological preferences and influences the form of 
words that the speaker should use.  I argue that pragmatics, and specifically implicature, 
constitutes a useful testbed for distinguishing these effects – the availability of an implicature 
can be used as an indicator that a particular stronger alternative would also have been an 
acceptable utterance, while its unavailability suggests that the stronger alternative would not 
necessarily have been acceptable.  I discuss recent experimental data from this perspective, 
and argue that both QUD and priming effects are customarily at play.  I conclude by 
exploring the implications of this for our view of pragmatics and its interfaces. 
 
Introduction 
The nature of quantity implicature is a much-discussed question in the recent pragmatics 
literature.  One particular focus of attention is whether implicatures are recovered in a 
traditionally pragmatic fashion (for instance, in accordance with a Gricean account) or 
whether they are obtained as default inferences (Levinson 2000) or via a grammatical process 
of parsing (Chierchia 2006).  A substantial volume of experimental research has been brought 
to bear on this issue over the past few years, but arguably the results have been inconclusive.  
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Work on the time-course of processing has found little evidence for default inferences, but 
has relied upon the assumption that such default processing would necessarily be less effort 
(and therefore faster) than Gricean-style reasoning.  More recently, work on so-called 
embedded implicatures, which are predicted to be generally unavailable under a Gricean 
account, has sparked a fierce debate as to the correct theoretical interpretation of the 
experimental findings (Geurts and Pouscoulous 2009, Chemla and Spector 2011). 
Although theoretically inconclusive, this body of experimental data has substantially 
informed our understanding of the factors bearing upon the ultimate interpretation of 
potential implicature triggers.  For instance, Goodman and Stuhlmüller (2013) (see also 
Cummins and Katsos 2010) show that hearers factor in the speaker’s knowledge state, and do 
not recover quantity implicatures (e.g. interpreting “some” as “not all”) in cases where the 
speaker is not knowledgeable about the stronger proposition (in this example “all”).  
Bonnefon, Feeney and Villejoubert (2011) show that hearers also refrain from recovering 
such implicatures in cases where the stronger proposition would have been face-threatening.  
Most pertinently for the purposes of this paper, Breheny, Katsos and Williams (2006) 
demonstrated that participants did not exhibit implicatures in cases where the stronger 
alternative proposition would not have been more useful given the purpose of the discourse. 
These results are largely predictable under a classical pragmatic account of quantity 
implicature (although they can also be encompassed by the alternative accounts, given 
auxiliary assumptions).  On the traditional view, a quantity implicature is argued to arise as a 
consequence of the speaker electing to make a particular statement instead of an 
informationally stronger one.  Consequently, no implicature is predicted to arise in cases 
where the speaker is effectively prohibited from making a stronger statement by external 
factors.  If the speaker does not know whether or not the stronger statement is true, the social 
obligation to avoid making potentially false statements (couched by Grice (1975) as the 
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maxim of quality) prevents them from asserting it.  Similarly, if the stronger statement would 
be face-threatening, we might reasonably suppose social considerations to militate against its 
use (as codified, for instance, by Leech’s (1983) maxim of Approbation).  In both cases, the 
speaker does not have a free hand to select an utterance purely on the basis of its 
informational value, so the preconditions for quantity implicature are not satisfied. 
The third case, in which the stronger statement is not necessary for the discourse 
purpose, may also be explicable in similar terms, but is perhaps a subtler matter.  To illustrate 
this, consider (1) and (2), sample materials from Breheny et al. (2006). 
 
(1) Mary asked John whether he intended to host all his relatives in his tiny apartment.  
John replied that he intended to host some of his relatives.  The rest would stay in a 
nearby hotel. 
(2) Mary was surprised to see John cleaning his apartment and she asked the reason why.  
John replied that he intended to host some of his relatives.  The rest would stay in a 
nearby hotel. 
 
The premise of this pair of examples is that (1) presents its second sentence, which 
contains the potential implicature trigger “some”, in an upper-bound context – that is, one in 
which the stronger alternative “all” would be relevant to the discourse purpose (answering 
Mary’s question).  By contrast, (2) presents its second sentence in a lower-bound context, in 
which the alternative “all” would not be relevant – the fact that John is hosting some of his 
relatives already suffices to explain why he is cleaning his apartment.  In a self-paced reading 
experiment, Breheny et al. (2006) document that reading times for “the rest” are faster in 
items such as (1) than in items such as (2). They interpret this as evidence that readers of 
items such as (1) (but not (2)) identify that the enriched reading of “some” (“some but not 
 CONTEXTUAL CAUSES OF IMPLICATURE FAILURE  4 
  
all”) is intended here (and consequently that there exists a complement set that can be called 
“the rest”). 
In this paper, I aim to look more closely at instances where implicatures’ failure to 
arise could theoretically be attributed to the lack of relevance of the stronger proposition.  I 
will suggest that these effects might typically be traceable either to high-level considerations 
of discourse organisation, such as can be expressed in terms of QUD, or to low-level 
mechanistic factors such as priming.  I consider the extent to which these factors can be 
disentangled, and what the availability of implicature might tell us about the way in which the 
QUD is constituted. 
 
Avoiding implicatures on relevance grounds 
The preferred account of how the implicature “not all” arises in cases such as (2) depends on 
the theoretical framework that we wish to adopt.  From a Gricean perspective, we can think 
of the use of “some” in (2) – unlike in (1) – as a possible consequence of the second 
submaxim of quantity, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”.  
We could argue that for John to announce that he intended to host all of his relatives – even if 
this was in fact the case – would potentially violate this submaxim.  Consequently, as hearers, 
we would be entitled to surmise that the use of “some” might merely reflect an unwillingness 
to be overinformative and use “all”, rather than an attempt to convey that “all” was not the 
case.  For this reason, we would again be able to predict the non-appearance of the 
implicature, on the basis that the use of “some” is not a reflection of the speaker’s choice but 
merely due to the obligation to obey the second submaxim of quantity. 
This argument parallels the account given in the previous section for the 
epistemically-motivated absence of potential implicatures – that is, the tendency for “some” 
not to implicate “not all” when the speaker is not knowledgeable about the proposition with 
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“all”.  However, one problem with extending that argument in this way is that there is a 
substantial asymmetry in strength between the maxim of quality (which precludes us from 
making statements for which we lack evidence) and the second submaxim of quantity.  Grice 
(1975: 46) felt that the former was a sine qua non of communication to the extent that it 
might not belong alongside the other maxims, which “come into operation only on the 
assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied”.  By contrast, overinformativeness – while 
generally dispreferred – does not seem to be a serious barrier to communication (see Davies 
and Katsos 2011 for relevant experimental data).  Moreover, it seems, on the face of it, 
completely reasonable and quite probable that a speaker would use “all” in (2) if they knew 
the resulting statement to be true.  Hence, the argument that there is no implicature because 
the speaker is prohibited from using the stronger alternative, “all”, does not seem entirely 
tenable in this case. 
As a consequence, it is tempting to suppose that the lack of spontaneous inference 
from “some” to “not all” in (2) might be due to the reader adopting a particular pragmatic 
strategy: for instance, stopping enrichment when a particular level of relevance is achieved 
(in a relevance-theoretic sense), or looking for the simplest answer to the Question Under 
Discussion (QUD).   
From a Relevance Theory (RT) perspective, it is predicted that hearers will perform 
pragmatic enrichments of the utterance until it achieves adequate cognitive effects (Wilson 
and Sperber 1994).  From this perspective, we can identify (1) as a case in which the 
enrichment from “some” to “some but not all” is necessary, presumably because it achieves 
the effect of answering Mary’s question (otherwise unanswered by the unenriched sentence), 
and (2) as a case in which it is not necessary, presumably because the unenriched “some” 
already achieves the effect of explaining John’s actions.  One limitation of this approach, 
which seems to be shared by experimental literature in an RT framework (for instance, Van 
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der Henst, Carles and Sperber 2002), is that is not clear, in general, what constitutes adequate 
cognitive effects.  By common consent, enriching “some” in (2) would still lead to additional 
cognitive effects (albeit at an additional processing cost), namely the hearer being able to 
conclude that “John does not intend to host all of his relatives”.  On the basis that this does 
not happen, we conclude that the unenriched meaning is adequate in this case, or that the 
additional effort involved in performing the enrichment does not yield sufficient extra effects 
to make it worthwhile.  However, if it did happen, we could simply affirm that the unenriched 
interpretation was inadequate in respect of the cognitive effects that it offers, and that the 
enrichment yields sufficient effects to make it worthwhile.  Either way, the data could be 
accommodated within the theoretical framework. 
As foreshadowed by Sperber and Wilson (1986), the idea of QUD offers one way of 
making this account more restrictive in its predictions.  We can distinguish cases such as (1) 
and (2) by noting that the sentence with “some” is directed towards a different QUD in the 
two cases.  In the former, the QUD appears to be “whether John will host all of his relatives”, 
and in the latter, it appears to be “why John is cleaning his apartment”.  In the former case, 
but not the latter, the enrichment from “some” to “some but not all” is required in order for 
John’s reported utterance to qualify as an answer to this QUD.  In particular, this would offer 
us a convenient way of determining when to stop enriching the utterance pragmatically, 
namely that we do so when we have satisfactorily divined the answer to the present QUD.   
In this particular experiment, the QUD is made explicit in the prior discourse context, 
but as Carlson (1982) observes (cited in Roberts 2012: 8), though dialogues may be ordered 
by question-answer relations, the questions themselves are often only implicit and must be 
inferred on the basis of other cues. Given just an utterance with “some”, a natural inference 
might be that the QUD is “how many?”, particularly if “some” is in some way identifiable as 
bearing focus. In (1), “some” is the only new material in its clause, and this might enable 
 CONTEXTUAL CAUSES OF IMPLICATURE FAILURE  7 
  
hearers to identify the QUD as one concerning quantity (thus promoting the quantity 
implicature from “some”). In (2), “some” is not the only new material, and it is easy to posit 
alternative QUDs that do not directly concern quantity. 
Alternatively, at a somewhat lower level of organisation, we could argue that there is 
a distinction between (1) and (2) in that (1) involves explicit prior mention of the term “all (of 
his relatives)”, against which “some (of his relatives)” could be considered contrastive.  As 
argued by Geurts and van Tiel (2013), contrastive environments of this kind are widely 
acknowledged to give rise to truth-conditional narrowing effects, which need not necessarily 
be analysable as implicatures in the Gricean sense.  Thus, we could argue that “some” in (1) 
may convey “not all” simply by virtue of the fact that it is not the word “all” that is used.  In 
(2), however, no such contrast exists, and no such enrichment proceeds. 
We could even go further and speculate that the pragmatic difference between (1) and 
(2) stems from considerations of priming.  In (1), a substantial portion of the sentence 
structure from Mary’s question is repeated in John’s response (“…he intended to host…”) – 
or, to be more precise, a stretch of dialogue that is attributed to Mary in her reported speech is 
subsequently also attributed to John.  This is suggestive of the presence of some form of 
priming effect, either at a syntactic level (Branigan et al. 2000) or at a lexical level (Bock 
1986). If John’s choice of utterance (or, the form of the second part of the speech report 
which concerns John’s utterance) is in part explained by priming effects, we might 
reasonably expect this pattern of primed re-use to continue in accordance with the previously 
used form of words (“…all his relatives”). Its failure to do so might then strongly suggest that 
this form of words would have resulted in a false statement – that is, we might infer that the 
pattern of exact repetition ends only because it runs into a conflicting Quality constraint. 
In practice, we might argue that it would be odd here for John to exhibit priming 
effects to the extent of reusing all the lexical material: instead, if the answer to Mary’s 
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question in (1) was affirmative, John could just say “yes”.  The fact that he does not could 
thus be argued to implicate that the answer must be “no”, and therefore that “not all” is the 
case, much as in the account based on contrastive enrichment specified above1.  Once again, 
none of this applies to the case of (2), in which the stronger proposition (“…all…”) is not 
mentioned in the preceding context in any way. 
In short, there are several possible explanations for the ostensibly “relevance-based” 
implicature failure in (2) by comparison with (1).  In the following section, I will discuss 
some recent data concerning implicatures in the numerical domain, and argue that this richer 
domain represents a better testbed for distinguishing between the various reasons for which 
these enrichments may arise or fail to arise. 
 
Avoiding irrelevant implicatures from numerical expressions 
Cummins, Sauerland and Solt (2012) provide experimental data suggesting that utterances 
such as (3) convey upper-bound readings to the effect that (4).  This suggests that “more than 
n”, for numeral n, might give rise to a quantity implicature.  This would contradict the claim 
of Fox and Hackl (2006) that “more than n” fails to give rise to such implicatures, a claim 
supported by the observation that (5) does not convey (6). 
 
(3) I have more than 60 CDs. 
(4) The speaker does not have more than 80 CDs. 
(5) John has more than two children. 
(6) John does not have more than three children. 
 
                                                          
1 We might ask why John’s failure to say “no” directly doesn’t implicate that the answer is “yes”.  There are 
several possible explanations: one simple possibility is that direct denial is disfavoured on politeness grounds, so 
its non-occurrence does not have similar pragmatic consequences to the non-occurrence of direct agreement. 
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Cummins et al. (2012) also document that the utterance (3) does not so robustly 
convey the upper-bound reading (4) if it occurs in a context in which the number has already 
been mentioned, for example if (7) was the preceding discourse turn. 
 
(7) This case holds 60 CDs.  How many CDs do you have? 
 
They propose that “more than 60” usually gives rise to an implicature conditioned by numeral 
salience.2  A speaker who was able to assert “more than 80” would prefer this over “more 
than 60” on the basis that it is more informative, while also using a number (80) that is 
equally salient to the alternative (60) and therefore cognitively inexpensive to use (following 
work on the psychology of number: see for instance Dehaene 1997, Butterworth 1999).  By 
contrast, “more than 61”, although more informative than “more than 60”, uses a number that 
is less salient, and by hypothesis more costly to use in processing terms.  For this reason, a 
hearer who encounters “more than 60” can conclude that the speaker is not able to assert 
“more than 80” but cannot conclude that the speaker is unable to assert “more than 61” – in 
fact, the speaker may not have done so simply to avoid using this less available number. 
This argument can also be expressed in terms of RT.  We can assume that the 
processing of a salient number involves less cognitive effort than that of a non-salient 
number.  Consequently, the use of “more than 61” – even if true – would involve the hearer 
incurring additional cognitive effort for the gain of relatively little extra cognitive effect 
(specifically, excluding the possibility that “61” might be the case) .  Hence, “more than 61” 
might not be more relevant than “more than 60”.  By contrast, the use of “more than 80” 
                                                          
2 As an anonymous reviewer points out, this upper-bound reading need not be an implicature in the true sense; it 
could, for instance, be a form of typicality-based inference that does not take into account the speaker’s 
intention. Cummins et al. (2012) do document some participants’ comments that suggest they were taking into 
account alternatives that the speaker could have used, which suggests that at least some of the responses are true 
implicatures, and there is a principled reason why such implicatures should be available, as discussed here. 
However, I agree that it is very possible that other species of pragmatic enrichment may also be involved. 
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would involve no extra cognitive effort and contribute additional cognitive effects, thus 
achieving higher relevance than “more than 60”.  It is plausible, therefore, that the hearer of 
“more than 60” (who under RT assumptions presumes that this utterance is optimally 
relevant) can infer that “more than 80” must not be the case, but cannot arrive at any firm 
conclusion about whether or not “more than 61” is the case. 
The weakening of the implicature “60” +> “not more than 80” when the prior context 
already makes the numeral salient (as in (7)) can be accounted for in at least two separate 
ways, either of which can be enfolded within an RT explanation.  One possibility is that the 
use of the number 60 is lexically primed by its prior use in the discourse, and can thereby be 
reused with less effort (both on the part of the speaker and of the hearer)3.  Under these 
circumstances, “more than 60” may be the most relevant possible utterance even if “more 
than 80” is the case: what it loses in cognitive effects it gains in the saving of cognitive effort.  
A rational hearer should, on that basis, be somewhat less willing to conclude that “more than 
80” does not hold, given the utterance of “more than 60”, than they would be if the latter was 
uttered out of the blue. 
An alternative explanation is that the failure of the implicature results from QUD 
considerations.  In Cummins et al.’s materials, it could be argued that the prior context invites 
the hearer to infer the existence of a more specific QUD.  In the case of (7), we might infer 
that the QUD that is raised is whether or not the addressee has more than 60 CDs, rather than 
merely how many CDs the addressee has.  Interpreted against that backdrop, (3) could be 
considered as a direct answer, in which the speaker affirms that it is the case that they have 
more than 60 CDs.   
                                                          
3 Note that this is not syntactic priming, of the kind discussed earlier in the paper, but priming of the number’s 
representation itself. Both kinds of priming are enfolded within Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) conception that 
“encountering an utterance that activates a particular representation makes it more likely that the person will 
subsequently produce an utterance that uses that representation”. However, as pointed out by an anonymous 
review, these two forms of priming might have radically different consequences for information structure, for 
instance in terms of what material is given and new at the point where the representation is reused. 
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From an RT standpoint, we can interpret this idea as a claim about cognitive effects.  
If the primary discourse goal is simply to answer the QUD posited above, then there is no 
significant gain to be made in terms of cognitive effects by performing further pragmatic 
enrichment, and this would come at a cost.  Assuming that the role of (3) is to maximise 
relevance, we should, by this account, take it to convey “more than 60” and not to implicate 
any kind of upper bound.  As discussed earlier, we might consider the QUD as a guide to 
when to stop reasoning about the utterance: that is, if we know that the QUD is answered, we 
can immediately cease considering the possibility of pragmatic enrichment, confident that 
any such enrichment will not yield appreciable gains in cognitive effects (and will incur 
additional cognitive effort, thus having lower relevance than the non-enriched 
interpretation).4 
On the other hand, the above line of argument relies upon treating QUDs as though 
they arise in isolation from one another, which is not necessarily the case in practice: indeed, 
Roberts (2012) construes discourse as giving rise to a stack of QUDs, such that the ultimate 
discourse purpose is satisfied by answering all these QUDs.  Returning to the exchange 
(7)/(3), we can naturally construe this as taking place within a dialogue in which one party is 
trying to suggest a suitable CD case for the other to buy.  If this is so, then although “whether 
more than 60” may be the immediate QUD, the question of “how many” remains unanswered 
by (3).  Concretely, if the customer has 110 CDs, for them to say “more than 60” invites a 
further dialogue subsequence in which they are offered, say, a case with room for 80 or 100 
CDs, and have to explain that this is inappropriate – a subsequence that could be 
circumvented entirely if they simply stated how many CDs they have at the first opportunity. 
                                                          
4 As a reviewer points out, this is only a practical proposition if we have some non-circular means of identifying 
the QUD. If we take the QUD to be whatever question is answered by the utterance, then the scope of the QUD 
itself can expand as the pragmatic enrichment of the sentence proceeds, and need not impose any constraint on 
it. However, in cases where the QUD is calculable on other grounds (including cases where it is explicitly 
given), it should be possible to curtail pragmatic enrichment by appeal to the QUD. 
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A complication here is that Roberts (2012) discusses answers to QUDs in terms of 
contextual entailment: that is, “a complete answer is a proposition which contextually entails 
an evaluation for each element of q-alt(q) [the set of alternatives]” (ibid., 11).  Under that 
definition, (9) and (10) would both be complete answers (in the affirmative) to the (polar) 
QUD (8). 
 
(8) Do you have more than 60 CDs? 
(9) I have more than 60 CDs. 
(10) I have more than 300 CDs. 
 
For (10), the proposed heuristic that we should stop enriching once the QUD is answered 
appears not to be appropriate.  The speaker of (10) seems to convey that she has between 300 
and 400 CDs, but that enrichment is not relevant to determining the answer to (8).  An 
intuitive way of looking at this is that the speaker of (10) has already elected to provide much 
more information than is necessary to answer the QUD, and – if cooperative – must therefore 
be presumed to be answering additional potential QUDs5.  This might account for why that 
heuristic would not apply: given that additional QUDs are in play, there is no straightforward 
way to characterise whether additional pragmatic enrichment is required to achieve adequate 
cognitive effects.  Consequently, applying the heuristic may not result in optimal relevance 
being achieved.  Whether it did so would depend on what the other QUDs were and how well 
they would be answered by the enriched versus the unenriched utterance – which is a 
                                                          
5 This would follow if we assume that over-informing is disfavoured per se, as per Grice’s second quantity 
submaxim.  It would also follow if we assume that the hearer of (10) has to perform additional reasoning steps 
in order to arrive at an answer to (8), whereas the hearer of (9) obtains that answer at once.  This latter idea is 
not entertained by Roberts, who draws no distinction between direct and indirect entailments, but could 
nevertheless be expressed within RT in terms of (10) imposing additional processing costs on the hearer.  Which 
analysis to adopt depends on whether we construe the speaker of (10) as telling the hearer extra things that they 
do not obviously need to know, or telling the hearer the things they need to know but in an unhelpfully indirect 
fashion. 
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problem we can frame within RT, although the answer is likely to be complex.  By contrast, 
(9) does not signal that the speaker is attempting to answer any QUDs apart from (8), so the 
decision not to enrich the meaning of (9) pragmatically would appear to be a sensible one. 
In short, then, the idea that the satisfaction of a particular QUD results in the non-
occurrence of further pragmatic reasoning appears plausible.  However, in the case of 
numerical expressions, the issue then arises of what additional QUDs are in play and how 
these can be identified.  I turn to this topic in the following section. 
 
Inferring contexts from the utterance 
Researchers in experimental semantics and pragmatics have long noted the possibility of their 
participants inferring the existence of specific contexts, given a particular utterance.  Breheny 
et al. (2006: 445) point out that “even single-sentence utterances can create their own context 
through a variety of presupposition triggers and information-structure triggers”.  As a 
methodological issue, it certainly seems clear that we cannot present dialogue fragments out 
of context and expect experimental participants to judge them in vacuo: and experimental 
designs (including those of Breheny et al. 2006) have attempted to address this problem.  
However, the question of precisely how these contexts come to be inferred, and what they 
consist of, has attracted less attention. 
The literature on QUD notably reflects an interest in how the sentence itself, as well 
as the prior context, contributes to the identification of the QUD.  As discussed earlier, the 
view adopted by Roberts (2012) is one in which the QUD may be inferred by discourse 
participants even when it is only implicit in the context.  Roberts (ibid.: 8) sees this as a 
special case of the process of plan inference, whereby we “infer interlocutors’ plans from 
other information in the common ground plus what is actually said”.  That is, the QUD can be 
identified partly on the basis of what has gone before and partly on the basis of what is 
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happening in the current utterance.  This idea has been explored particularly with reference to 
focus structure, where the observation is that sentential focus is associated with the material 
that is being questioned (Rooth 1996).  We may be able to identify what is being questioned 
from the prior context, but we may also be able to detect the focus structure of the sentence 
from the signal itself, and use this as a cue to identifying the QUD.  As Zondervan (2011: 
225) puts it, “a sentence-level property like focus structure is actually reflecting a contextual 
property, namely that of the QUD”.  But, as Roberts (2012) identifies, this is just one of the 
factors at play.  She implies that other sentence-level considerations may also enter into the 
hearer’s calculation of the QUD, and indeed that other inferences about the goals of the 
discourse may also be drawn on the basis of the current sentence’s content. 
In the case of numerically quantified expressions, it seems quite clear that more 
specific QUDs than simply “how many” can be signalled by, and recognised from, the use of 
specific numbers and quantifiers.  For example, (11), (12) and (13) each use the quantifying 
expression “more than 60” with the argument “senators”. 
 
(11) Perhaps by then, more than 60 senators will side with victims over commanders.6 
(12) More than 60 senators prepared to vote for Rx importation.7 
(13) “There’s more than 60 senators, I’m convinced, who are prepared to vote for this bill, 
including Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”.8 
 
These three examples concern different topics within US politics, but each appears to answer 
a related QUD: in each case, not merely how many senators are predicted to vote in favour of 
                                                          
6 http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/editorials/article/Setback-for-sexual-assault-victims-5297981.php, 
retrieved 27 May 2014 
7 http://www.fdanews.com/articles/71127-more-than-60-senators-prepared-to-vote-for-rx-importation-enzi-says, 
retrieved 27 May 2014 
8 http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/don-don-joe-lieberman-democrats-60-votes-repeal-policy-article-
1.452082, retrieved 27 May 2014 
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a particular measure, but specifically whether or not more than 60 are predicted to do so.  For 
this reason, each of (11)-(13), even taken out of context, seems strongly to suggest that this 
particular question is of broader interest – that is, that 60 is a critical threshold of votes in the 
US Senate for these various purposes (as is in fact the case).   
It also seems natural to interpret these examples as not conveying a clear pragmatic 
upper bound, which would be a logical consequence of the QUD being “whether more than 
60”, as discussed in the preceding section.  This seems to agree with the results obtained by 
Cummins et al. (2012): they documented somewhat inconsistent behaviour with “more than 
n” when there was no numeral mentioned in the prior context, and particularly when the 
number n itself was non-round (for instance, 97).  That could be attributable to some of the 
participants inferring contexts of utterance in which “more than n” was in fact a QUD, and 
declining to perform pragmatic enrichment for that reason.  Indeed, in corpora, the use of 
“more than n” with large non-round n is extremely rare in cardinal contexts (Cummins 2015: 
172), and appears to be largely restricted to cases in which the specific numeral is of especial 
importance in the given context. 
What about the use of small numbers in conjunction with “more than”, as in (5), 
repeated below?  It seems uncontroversial that (5) does not implicate (6) – we can discern this 
on the basis that (5) and (6) taken together would entail (14), and it is uncontroversial that an 
utterance of (5) does not typically convey (14). 
 
(5) John has more than two children. 
(6) John does not have more than three children. 
(14) John has exactly three children. 
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There are, in principle, several reasons why this might be the case.  First, we could argue that 
“more than two” systematically fails to give rise to implicatures of this kind, perhaps on the 
basis that small numbers are mentally represented differently to large numbers in some way.  
However, this explanation seems somewhat arbitrary.  The absence of implicature is not, for 
instance, restricted to the subitizing range (“more than seven” does not convey “exactly 
eight”), and implicatures are available from small numbers in non-cardinal usages (for 
instance, (15) does seem to implicate (16)).  To support this explanation, we would have to 
suppose that small numbers (up to some threshold) were generally associated with multiple 
different representations depending upon whether or not they were being used as integers, 
which appears to ‘multiply entities’ without very compelling justification. 
 
(15) On average, families in Europe have more than two children. 
(16) It is not the case that, on average, families in Europe have more than three children. 
 
A second possibility is that the candidate implicature from (5) fails on the basis of its 
inherent inefficiency.  We could reason as follows: if (5) implicated (6), the use of (5) by an 
informed and cooperative speaker would convey (14).  However, no such speaker would 
choose to convey (14) by uttering (5), as this achieves no greater effect and requires more 
effort on the part of the hearer (alternatively, because (5) is informationally weaker and no 
easier to express).  As the hearer, we should rationally conclude that the speaker cannot 
possibly have meant that, and dispense with the implicature for that reason. 
This line of analysis resembles the multi-step process of reasoning proposed by 
Degen, Franke and Jäger (2013) for the assignment of referring expressions.  It certainly 
seems computationally tractable for us, as hearers, to proceed in this way.  Nevertheless, as 
far as example (5) is concerned, such an account seems counterintuitive.  When hearing (5), 
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we appear to latch on automatically to the idea that the utterance conveys only a lower bound 
reading, and there is no evidence that we go through a complex reasoning process to cancel 
the unwanted implicature.  In principle, it is quite possible that the reasoning in question is 
performed so effectively by the hearer that it causes no discernible delay in response and that 
its intermediate stages are not accessible to introspection: for instance, because the absence of 
an implicature emerges in this case from the same kind of routinized reasoning process that 
has been argued (e.g. by Levinson 2000) to underpin certain implicatures that do arise. If we 
admit that possibility, a multi-step account is difficult to falsify.  However, I think it worth 
exploring other options before falling back upon this type of explanation.  
A third possibility, then, is that the use of “more than two” in a cardinal context 
conveys that the specific QUD is “whether or not more than two is the case”.  If we assume 
that the speaker of (5) is knowledgeable and cooperative, it appears at least very likely that 
this kind of QUD is in effect: if the actual QUD existed at a higher or lower level of 
specificity, then the use of (5) by a knowledgeable speaker would supply either too much or 
too little information.  So the hearer of (5) might reasonably conclude that either the QUD 
concerns whether or not “more than two” is the case, or that the speaker is not fully 
knowledgeable on the topic, or that the speaker is uncooperative.  In any of these cases, the 
rational hearer should decline to perform a pragmatic enrichment.9   
This account squares with the observation that the speaker of (17) would naturally be 
assumed to be in a context in which the question of whether or not John has more than two 
children is sufficiently salient to license it being answered directly. 
 
                                                          
9 As a reviewer points out, if we appeal to this idea, we need to be able to explain why the hearer of “more than 
60” does not likewise assume that “whether more than 60” is likely to be the QUD, and consequently decline to 
draw the implicature. A possible answer is that “whether more than 60” is known from experience to be a less 
common question of interest than “whether more than two”. Another possibility is that “more than n”, for large 
round n, is used to relate relatively ‘inaccessible’ non-round quantities to round quantities that serve as cognitive 
landmarks, which would cohere with the view of Dehaene (1997). This is not the case for small cardinal values, 
as their neighbours are also small cardinal values and can be expressed just as efficiently in their own right. 
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(17) John has more than two children; in fact, he has five. 
 
However, if we are to be able to account for examples such as this, we may need to refine the 
notion of what constitutes an answer to a QUD.  For (17), even if the current QUD concerns 
whether or not John has more than two children, simply affirming that he has five children 
would clearly entail a complete answer to this question.  The justification for the 
circumlocution of (17) seems to be that it is helpful to give a direct answer to the QUD, and 
not to require the hearer to perform an additional inference (figuring out that “five” is “more 
than two”).  However, this notion of a “direct answer” such as (17) being admissible, or by 
any measure preferable to a response that simply entails the required answer, seems to 
conflict with the idea that contextual entailment is a sufficient condition for complete 
answerhood. 
 
Distinguishing QUD from priming effects 
There is at least one more distinct account of how the implicature from “more than two” 
might systematically fail to arise.  On this account, rather than inferring the existence of a 
specific QUD of the kind sketched above, the hearer of (5) simply infers that the speaker had 
a particular reason to use this precise number (or, more generally, expression).  Consider the 
use of “more than 100”.  We might argue that this doesn’t typically reflect the existence of a 
QUD “whether more than 100”, but simply represents a cognitively efficient way to convey 
an approximate value, given the high salience of “100” in our mental number system 
compared to its near neighbours.  Analogously, if we imagine circumstances in which “two” 
was made much more salient than its neighbours – for instance, because its representation 
had been primed by recent prior use, while its neighbours had not – we might expect a 
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speaker to use it in preference to its neighbours, even if the specific question of “whether 
more than two” was not pertinent to any of the participants’ discourse goals. 
Under such circumstances, the hearer would be predicted not to draw pragmatic 
enrichments, on the basis that the speaker may have declined to utter informationally stronger 
alternatives merely on the basis that they did not involve primed numerals.  Assuming that a 
primed numeral is, by hypothesis, easier to use than an unprimed numeral, the use of 
informationally stronger alternatives would then have come with an additional cost 
(potentially both for speaker and hearer), which might not have been outweighed by the 
additional benefits in terms of cognitive effects.  That is, it is possible that the most relevant 
option (in an RT sense) would be for the speaker to make the weaker statement using the 
primed numeral.  Hence, the rational hearer of “more than two” should not attempt to 
perform pragmatic enrichment in this case. 
I take it as uncontroversial that this conjectured priming effect is not the same thing as 
adherence to QUD, even though the pragmatic consequences would be superficially similar.  
Priming is taken to be a low-level, unconscious process, whereas the establishment of the 
QUD is a matter of high-level discourse planning.  If the speaker is assumed to be providing a 
minimal and direct answer to the QUD, the hearer can further infer something about the 
interlocutors’ discourse goals, whereas if the speaker is assumed merely to be exhibiting 
priming effects, the hearer can infer something about the content of the previous discourse, 
but nothing about its goals.  Priming effects of this kind could, in principle, arise purely by 
happenstance: if a number were to be mentioned frequently in the context of one set of 
discourse goals, it could in principle exert an effect on the numbers used in a separate portion 
of the discourse, even if it were not relevant to any of the goals of this latter discourse. 
If the intuitions discussed earlier in this paper are correct, the ability of hearers to 
infer the existence of a specific QUD are not in doubt.  The question of whether the hearers 
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also take account of the possible presence of priming effects remains open.  Rationally, this 
should be bound up with the question of whether speakers exhibit priming effects of this kind 
in their productions.  Although the justification for priming effects in this domain appears 
sound, it may be extremely marginal in actual discourse.  Notably, most successful 
demonstrations of priming effects appear to have focused on areas with relatively low 
informational load: for instance, dative alternation (Branigan et al. 2000).  Although speakers 
have a clear preference in this domain (i.e. for saying “Mary gave the Y to the X” rather than 
“Mary gave the X the Y”), and this preference may be subordinated to priming of the 
disfavoured form, the choice of expression does not seem to have any discernible 
communicative consequences.  By contrast, saying “more than two” rather than “more than 
three” would involve giving up a substantial amount of information, and it is not clear 
whether priming effects are strong enough to compel speakers ever to do so.  Intermediate 
cases are those in which there is a relatively free choice of number, and the possibility of 
priming effects might account for examples such as (18)-(20).  In these cases, the speakers’ 
decision to use the number 24 appears to be motivated by the association between “24” and 
“carat” rather than reflecting a deliberate decision about how much quantity to express. (“24 
carat” denotes a standard of perfect purity for gold, but merely a mass (=4.8g) for diamonds.) 
 
(18) He’s a 24-carat diamond geezer10 
(19) How much does a 24 carat diamond cost?11 
(20) Damien James – 24 Carat Diamond12 
 
                                                          
10 http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2007/jun/10/art, retrieved 27 May 2014 
11 http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_much_does_a_24_carat_diamond_cost?, retrieved 27 May 2014 
12 http://www.trevorgeorge.co.uk/portfolio/damien-james-24-carat-diamond/, retrieved 27 May 2014 
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To distinguish between the QUD and priming-based explanations for implicature 
failure in cases such as (5) would require further experimental work, which I am not 
attempting within this paper.  I conjecture that it will not be possible to disprove the priming 
account directly via experimental means, for the following reason.  Suppose that the QUD-
based account is correct and the hearer of (5) assumes that the question of “whether more 
than two” is open.  We can attempt to explore priming effects by manipulating the prior 
context to include relevant or irrelevant instances of the number “two”.  However, given that 
the speaker is knowledgeable and cooperative, I would argue that (5) so strongly suggests the 
presence of an open QUD “whether more than two” that the contextual manipulation will 
have no effect. 
We can nevertheless go some way towards bringing the predictions of these accounts 
into conflict by using materials with larger round numbers.  Recall that we expect “more than 
60” to implicate “not more than 80”, but for this effect to be vulnerable to contextual 
manipulation.  That is, when “60” is mentioned in the prior context in a relevant way, the 
implicature is less reliably available to hearers (as shown by Cummins et al. 2012).  If the 
priming explanation is the correct one, this effect should also be evident if the numeral “60” 
is merely mentioned in the prior context, even in a way that is irrelevant to the quantifying 
statement under test.  If the QUD-based explanation is correct, the effect should be available 
only if the numeral “60” is used in such a way as to introduce the question “whether more 
than 60” into the discourse.  Hence, by manipulating the status of the numeral in the 
preceding context, we can go some way towards discerning whether the reduction in 
implicature is due to priming or to QUD-driven effects.  In either case, participants may still 
infer the relevance of “60” or the existence of the QUD “whether more than 60”, and decline 
to derive the implicature on that basis, so the results might not be clear-cut.  However, as we 
know that “more than 60” can implicate “not more than 80” when presented out of the blue, 
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we can be confident that the absence of implicature is not obligatory given this quantifying 
expression. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
There is ample evidence that quantity implicatures fail to arise in cases where the stronger 
statement, which the implicature negates, would not have been relevant.  However, it is 
correspondingly difficult to define precisely what constitutes “relevance”.  Relevance Theory 
offers an account in which optimal relevance is construed as the greatest possible ratio of 
cognitive effects to effort on the part of the hearer.  Yet even if we adopt this construal of 
relevance, there are at least two distinct reasons why an implicature might not be obtained by 
the hearer in a given situation.  It could be that the QUD is already satisfied without further 
enrichment, and thus the implicature is not required for adequate cognitive effects to be 
achieved.  Or it could be that a weak expression is more economical to use than the stronger 
alternative would be, under the particular circumstances that prevail at the time of utterance. 
As is so often the case in experimental studies of implicature, the relevant literature 
has focused on very few triggers, predominantly “some” (+> “not all”) and “or” (+> “not 
and”).  A typical approach has been to contrast the interpretation of an implicature trigger in a 
context in which the stronger alternative is explicitly made relevant with its interpretation in a 
more neutral context.  However, this approach does not enable us clearly to distinguish the 
two accounts sketched in the previous paragraph: indeed, some of the materials admit a third 
interpretation in which the pragmatic enrichment is potentially attributable to contrast effects.  
Moreover, when the triggers are presented in ostensibly neutral contexts, it is likely that 
hearers sometimes infer the existence of more elaborate contexts and interpret the target 
expression as though it had been produced in that specific context. 
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In this paper I have discussed the possibility of using numerical expressions as a 
testbed for investigating which aspects of the prior context are materially relevant to the 
question of whether or not an implicature is recovered.  Expressions such as “more than n”, 
used in cardinal quantifying contexts, give rise to implicatures, and these implicatures appear 
to be susceptible to contextual manipulation in a predictable way.  In some respects the 
pragmatics of such utterances is more complex than that of implicature triggers like “some”: 
various distinct enrichments are available, an assortment of different contexts can be inferred 
by hearers, and these issues are bound up with the psychology of number in a non-trivial way.  
However, this does present a potentially rich domain of experimental enquiry.  Notably, we 
can manipulate the role as well as the presence of numerals in the prior context, and thus 
distinguish between the effect of providing an explicit QUD involving a particular numeral 
and the effect of merely mentioning that numeral.  We can also exploit the observation that 
different numerical expressions give rise to different inferences about the content of the prior 
discourse, and use this to explore how we integrate inferences of this kind with the explicit 
knowledge that we have about the discourse.  This has the potential to contribute to a fuller 
understanding of how we infer QUDs (as well as other aspects of the overarching discourse 
purpose), and how we update those inferences in response to new incoming information. 
Research on low-level priming effects, striving towards a mechanistic psychology of 
dialogue (as expressed by the title of Pickering and Garrod’s 2004 paper), posits that 
speakers’ productions are substantially conditioned by the content of the preceding discourse.  
Accounts based on high-level planning, such as Roberts’s (2012) model, take a view of 
communication that is markedly more strategic on the part of the interlocutors.  By better 
understanding the respective roles of QUD-based and priming-based effects in the selection 
and interpretation of expressions, we can obtain a fuller appreciation of the relative 
contributions of these two features of dialogue to the process of human-human interaction. 
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